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Can Owning a Home Hedge the Risk of Moving?†
By Todd Sinai and Nicholas Souleles*
For households that face a possibility of moving across MSAs, the
risk of home owning depends on the covariance of the sale prices
of their current houses with the purchase prices of their likely future
houses. We find empirically that households tend to move between
highly correlated MSAs, significantly increasing the distribution of
expected correlations in real house price growth across MSAs, and
so raising the “moving-hedge” value of owning. Own/rent decisions
are sensitive to this hedging value, with households being more likely
to own when their hedging value is greater due to higher expected
correlations and likelihoods of moving. JEL (D14, R21, R23, R31)

C

onventional wisdom holds that one of the riskiest aspects of owning a house is
the uncertainty surrounding its sale price. It is now well appreciated that house
prices can be quite volatile. Between the end of 2005 and the end of 2008, real house
prices fell by more than 31 percent, according to the Case-Shiller 10-city composite
house price index. Over the prior five years, real house prices in the same cities rose
by almost 73 percent. Similarly, after real house prices rose substantially during the
1980s, they fell by 26 percent between 1990 and 1997.
Historically, analysts have concluded that this volatility in house prices makes home
owning risky. One common argument is that a gain or a loss on a house could have a
considerable effect on a household’s balance sheet, especially since the primary residence comprises about two-thirds of the median homeowner’s assets (2004 Survey of
Consumer Finances). The resulting change in household wealth could have significant effects on household consumption, (Case, Quigley, and Shiller 2005; Campbell
and Cocco 2007; Attanasio et al. 2009; and Calomiris, Longhofer, and Miles 2009).
Another common claim is that a loss on a house could impair a household’s ability
to purchase their next house. Since nearly 45 percent of households move within a
five-year period, and one-fifth of such households leave their metropolitan area, this
risk is potentially large.

* Sinai: The Wharton School-University of Pennsylvania, 1465 Steinberg Hall-Dietrich Hall, 3620 Locust
Walk, Philadelphia, PA 19104 (e-mail: Sinai@wharton.upenn.edu); Souleles: The Wharton School-University of
Pennsylvania, 2300 Steinberg Hall-Dietrich Hall, 3620 Locust Walk, Philadelphia, PA 19104 (e-mail: souleles@
wharton.upenn.edu). We are grateful to Dimo Primatov for helpful research assistance and two anonymous referees, and seminar participants at the National Bureau of Economic Research, Stanford University, the University
of Amsterdam, the University of Wisconsin/Chicago Fed Housing Conference, the University of Washington
St. Louis, and Wharton for useful feedback. Sinai thanks the Research Sponsors Program of the Zell-Lurie Real
Estate Center at Wharton for financial support.
†
To comment on this article in the online discussion forum, or to view additional materials, visit the article page
at http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/pol.5.2.282.
282

Vol. 5 No. 2

Sinai and Souleles: Can Owning a Home Hedge the Risk of Moving?

283

These arguments rely on an assumption that houses are like standard financial
assets, where increases in value, once realized, can be spent on a greater quantity
of goods and services. However, a homeowner who sells his house still has to live
somewhere after the house is sold. Although the sale price of the current house is
uncertain, the purchase price of the subsequent house is also uncertain. If the prices
of the current and subsequent houses move independently, a homeowner actually
faces two sources of risk: sale price risk (for the current house) and purchase price
risk (for a subsequent house). But if current and future houses have positively covarying prices, gains or declines in value are offset by increases or decreases in price.
In fact, sale price uncertainty for the current house could actually undo purchase
price uncertainty for the subsequent house, reducing the volatility in the quantity of
housing that could be purchased after a move.
A few recent papers have recognized that it is the sale price net of the subsequent
purchase price, rather than the sale price alone, that matters for the risk of home
owning, (Ortalo-Magné and Rady 2002, Sinai and Souleles 2005, and Han 2010).
However, these papers—along with conventional wisdom—assume that the correlation in house price across housing markets is low, which implies that the volatility of
the sale price of a house is risky given how frequently households move across metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs).
Our main contribution is to show that, for many households, the sale price of
their current house positively commoves with the purchase price of their next house
even when the next house is in a different city. Due to the positive covariance, the
volatility of the sale price of a house at least partially undoes the volatility of the cost
of obtaining the next house. In effect, owning a house provides a hedge against the
uncertain purchase price of a future house in another city.1
The conventional wisdom—that house prices do not covary much—is correct when
one considers the United States on average. However, the unconditional national average masks two important factors. First, there is considerable heterogeneity across city
pairs within the United States in how much their house prices covary, ranging from
negative covariances to very highly positive covariances. Second, households do not
move to random locations; instead, they tend to move between highly covarying housing markets. Because of these two factors, the expected covariance in house prices—
where the expectation is weighted by the household’s own probabilities of moving
to each other location—is quite high. For example, the simple unweighted median
correlation in house price growth across US MSAs is only 0.35. When we account for
where households are likely to move, the baseline effective correlation faced by the
1

The benefit of home owning as a hedge against future house price risk in other cities is generally undeveloped
in prior research. Ortalo-Magné and Rady (2002) illustrate in a simple theoretical model that house prices in one
period hedge prices in the next period if the prices covary across the periods, but provide no empirical evidence on
the magnitude or effect of the hedge. Sinai and Souleles (2005) show theoretically how sale price risk depends on
the covariance between house prices in the current and future housing markets, but their primary empirical focus is
on how home owning hedges volatility in housing costs within a given housing market. Han (2010) distinguishes
within- and out-of-state moves in a structural model of housing consumption using the Panel Study of Income
Dynamics. However, she does not know where households move if they move out of state, so she does not estimate
cross-state covariances. To the degree that the sell/buy risk is considered in the prior literature, it emphasizes buying and selling houses within the same market, where the correlation in house prices is presumed to be high. For
example, Cocco (2000) considers how home owning hedges the cost of trading up to a larger house within the same
housing market for liquidity constrained households.
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median household rises substantially, to 0.60. The seventy-fifth percentile household
enjoys an even higher correlation, of 0.89.
That the expected covariance in house prices is high for many households yields
important implications for several areas of economics. For example, a household’s
marginal propensity to consume (MPC) out of housing wealth is determined, in part,
by the degree to which a change in house value constitutes a change in wealth. If,
due to a high expected covariance in house prices, a housing capital gain is undone
by a rise in expected future housing expenses, then the true change in household
wealth from a rise in house prices is small, and so the MPC out of that capital
gain should be low. Second, the expected covariance in house prices potentially
affects the demand for home owning. Because expected covariances are quite high
for many households, owning a house can provide a valuable hedge against house
price risk, especially for households who are likely to move. This benefit extends
even to those households who do not know exactly where they are going to move. As
long as they are likely to move between positively covarying markets, home owning
helps hedge their expected purchase price risk.2 Since all households have to obtain
future housing somehow, home owning actually can reduce the expected volatility
in the net cost of selling one house and buying another. Third, Ortalo-Magné and
Prat (2010) show theoretically that this expected covariance is one of the key parameters in the asset pricing of a house. Higher expected covariances yield higher house
prices in their model, and reduce the demand for stocks that are correlated with
housing markets. Finally, the degree of covariance affects the demand for housing
derivatives of the sort proposed by Case, Shiller, and Weiss (1993) or housing equity
insurance programs of the kind described by Caplin et al. (2003). When owning a
house already acts as a natural hedge for future housing consumption, it reduces
the demand for derivatives intended to reduce housing volatility, depending on how
complete the natural hedge is.
Our second contribution is an application of our estimates of expected covariance
to the context of housing demand. We show that households’ tenure decisions (to
rent versus own) appear to be sensitive to the “moving-hedge” benefit of owning.
We bring three sources of variation to bear on this issue. First, the typical household
across different MSAs may have a bigger, smaller, or even negative hedging benefit
of home owning depending on the variance of house prices in the local MSA and
the covariances with prices in other MSAs. Second, within an MSA, households differ in their expected covariances because they differ in their likelihoods of moving
to each of the other MSAs. Third, the effect of the expected house price covariance
should be attenuated for households who, for demographic reasons, appear unlikely
to move in the near future. Households who do not anticipate moving have little
need for a hedge against future house prices, and thus differences in the potential
moving-hedge benefit of owning should have little effect on their tenure decisions.
2
In order to highlight how the risk of home owning is affected by the house’s moving-hedge properties, we
abstract from the important effect of housing finance on household risk. Financing any volatile asset with high
leverage creates risk, a topic which has been considered at length in prior research. For example, for leveraged,
liquidity-constrained households, downturns in prices can lead to lock-in and more volatile consumption and prices,
(Stein 1995, Chan 2001, Genesove and Mayer 1997, 2001, Hurst and Stafford 2004, Lustig and Van Nieuwerburgh
2005, Li and Yao 2007, and Ferreira, Gyourk, and Tracy 2010).
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We use household-level data on homeownership and moving probabilities, and
MSA-level estimates of house price variances and covariances, to identify the effect
of expected house price covariances on homeownership decisions. We use demographic characteristics such as age, marital status, and occupation to impute an exogenous probability of moving for each household. We impute the odds of a household
moving to specific MSAs, conditional on moving at all, by applying the actual geographic distribution of moves by other households in similar industry or age categories in the originating MSA. This combination of MSA and household level variation
enables us to identify the effect of expected house price covariances on homeownership decisions while controlling separately for MSA and household characteristics.
Overall, we find that for a household with an average expected length of stay in
its house, the likelihood of home owning increases by 0.6 percentage points when
the expected covariance rises by one standard deviation. This effect is larger for
households with a higher likelihood of moving to another MSA. A household who
is imputed to have a one-in-three chance of moving would have a 1 to 2 percentage
point higher likelihood of home owning if faced with a one standard deviation
increase in expected covariance. The results are robust to different ways of imputing
the likelihood of a household’s moving to the various MSAs, such as instrumenting
for the actual moving patterns of households with the patterns we would predict if
households moved based on the distribution of their industry’s employment or their
occupations across MSAs.
In Section I, we estimate households’ effective covariances between house price
growth in their current markets and in their expected future markets, and explain
why conventional wisdom has assumed those covariances are low when they are
actually quite high on average. We turn to our application in Section II, where we
present a simple theoretical framework that illustrates the moving-hedge benefit
of owning and motivates our empirical tests. Section III describes the various data
sources we use. The empirical identification strategy and results are presented in
Section IV, with some robustness tests in Section V. Section VI briefly concludes.
I. The Correlation of House Prices across MSAs

Most analysts have concluded that there is little covariance in prices across markets because the national average covariance (equally weighting MSAs) is fairly
low. However, that simple average masks three important factors that together often
cause the effective covariance faced by households to be quite high. First, there is
considerable heterogeneity across housing markets in their covariances with other
housing markets. The national average covariance obscures this heterogeneity.
Second, households do not move at random. Instead, they are more likely to move
between more highly covarying housing markets. Because of the systematic moving, the average household’s expected covariance is higher than the average covariance across MSAs (equally or population-weighted).
Third, the distribution of expected covariances has a long lower tail. Because of
this skewness, the median household’s expected covariance is even higher than that
of the average household. That is, while many households have high expected covariances, a minority has very low expected covariances, which lowers the average.
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Figure 1. The Distribution of Correlation in House Price Growth Rates (unweighted)

The heterogeneity across and within housing markets can be seen in Figure 1,
which graphs the distribution of house price correlations by MSA, for a subsample
of the largest MSAs.3 We estimate the correlations in real annual growth in the
OFHEO constant-quality MSA-level house price index over the 1980 to 2005 time
period. The OFHEO index is computed using repeat sales of single-family houses
with conforming mortgages. While the index is widely believed to understate effective house price volatility because it does not take into account differences in liquidity between housing booms and busts, it is available for a long period for many
different MSAs, making it the best price index available for our purposes.
In Figure 1, each vertical grey/black bar represents a metropolitan area. The bottom
of each bar is set at the fifth percentile of the MSA’s house price correlations with each
of the other MSAs. In this chart, each MSA is equally weighted and the correlation of
an MSA with itself (which would equal one) is excluded. Moving from bottom to top,
a bar turns from grey to black at the twenty-fifth percentile, then from black to grey
at the seventy-fifth percentile, and the grey portion ends at the ninety-fifth percentile.
Thus the black part of a bar covers the interquartile range of correlations across MSAs,
and the entire grey/black bar covers the fifth percentile to the ninety-fifth percentile.
The first thing to note in Figure 1 is that there is substantial heterogeneity across
MSAs in their house price correlations with the rest of the country, since the bars
for some MSAs start and end higher than the others. For example, consider the distribution of correlations { ρatl, j} between house prices in Atlanta (the first city in
the figure) and each of the other cities j. The fifth percentile correlation is −0.05,
3
In our empirical application, the across-MSA hedging depends on the covariance of house prices across MSAs.
However, since correlations are easier to interpret visually, this section discusses the correlations of prices across
MSAs. The conclusions using covariances are the same.
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and the ninty-fifth percentile correlation is 0.73. By contrast, for Austin the corresponding percentiles are lower, −0.40 and 0.54. San Antonio has the lowest fifth
and ninety-fifth percentiles, ranging from −0.50 to 0.47. The highest among the
fifth percentiles of correlations is in Miami (0.13), and the highest of the ninetyfifth percentiles is in New York (0.94).
While the fifth through the ninety-fifth percentile correlations always overlap across
cities, some of the interquartile ranges (the black bars) do not overlap. In Atlanta, the
interquartile range of the correlations runs from 0.27 to 0.50, which does not overlap
at all with the interquartile range in Austin, which runs from −0.22 to 0.17.
The second interesting fact apparent in Figure 1 is that the within-MSA heterogeneity in correlations (with other MSAs) also varies considerably across MSAs. This
variation can be seen in the lengths of the grey and black bars. MSAs whose bars are
stretched out relative to the other MSAs have more heterogeneity in their correlations, being relatively uncorrelated with other MSAs and relatively highly correlated
with others. For example, New York has a −0.22 correlation with its fifth percentile
correlation city, but a 0.94 correlation with its ninety-fifth percentile city. There is
relatively less heterogeneity within Minneapolis, where the corresponding correlations range from 0.12 (fifth percentile) to 0.68 (ninety-fifth percentile). There is
also significant heterogeneity in the sizes of the interquartile ranges. The widest
interquartile range is in Salt Lake City, which spans from −0.18 to 0.33. The narrowest range is in Minneapolis. However, the cities with the widest fifth to ninetyfifth percentile ranges are not necessarily the same ones with the widest interquartile
ranges. For example, New York’s interquartile range runs from 0.12 to 0.53, about
the same as Nashville, even though Nashville’s fifth to ninety-fifth range is much
tighter. San Jose’s interquartile range is fairly tight at 0.15 to 0.38, even though the
fifth to ninety-fifth percentile range is middle-of-the-road.
In Figure 2, by contrast, we take into account where households are likely to
move, by weighting the correlations by the probability of moving. We compute the
weighted correlation for a household living in MSA k by combining the vector of
house price correlations between MSA k and the other MSAs (denoted by l), with the
probability that a given household living in MSA k would move to each of the other
MSAs: E( corr( PA , PB   ))   k  = ∑ l   wk,l  corr(Pk, Pl). The house price correlation vector,
corr(Pk  , Pl), is constructed by computing the correlation of real annual house price
growth over the 1980–2005 period based on the OFHEO index described earlier.
To impute a household’s likelihood of moving from an MSA to the other MSAs,
we use data from the US Department of the Treasury’s County-to-County Migration
Patterns. The US Treasury data uses the addresses listed on tax returns to determine whether a household moved. It aggregates the gross flows across counties and
reports, annually for each county pair, the number of tax returns where the taxpayers
moved from the origination county to the destination county. We aggregated the
counties into MSAs, and for each MSA computed the fraction of its tax-filing
households who move to each of the other MSAs. We use those fractions as estimates of the probabilities of any household in the MSA making the corresponding
MSA-to-MSA move. These moving-shares are the weights for computing
the distributions in Figure 2. Note that the figure considers only out-of-MSA
moves—within-MSA moves are excluded from the weights and the graph.
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Figure 2. The Distribution of Correlation in House Price Growth Rates
(weighted by IRS migration flows to identified MSAs)

When we weight by where households typically move, it becomes clear that most
households face much higher effective correlations than indicated in the first figure,
because households are more likely to move to more highly correlated MSAs. In
Figure 2, the distributions of correlations shift upwards in nearly every MSA.4 In
many MSAs the top of the black bar shifts up near the top of the grey bar. This
implies that the entire top quartile of correlations for these MSAs is close to one.
(It is impossible to obtain a correlation of exactly one in our data since we exclude
within-MSA moves and no MSAs are perfectly correlated with each other.)
For example, in New York, the seventy-fifth percentile correlation shifts up to
0.95 from 0.53 in Figure 1, and the twenty-fifth percentile shifts to 0.50 from 0.12.
In Miami and Detroit, the correlation is expected to be at least 0.66 three-quarters
of the time. In most cities, even the fifth percentile correlation rises considerably. In
New York, it increases to 0.31 from −0.22. Similarly large shifts of the entire probability distribution occur in San Francisco, Dallas, and Philadelphia, among others.
Not every metro area experiences such a sizeable shift in their correlation distributions after weighting. Atlanta and Phoenix, for example, change relatively little.
Also, in many MSAs the fifth percentile correlation remains fairly low or negative.
While those MSAs still exhibit an overall upwards shift in their distributions, the

4

The exceptions are minor and tend to occur in cities where there are relatively few high-correlation destinations. Every reported percentile cutoff increases once we weight by the moving probabilities, except: Chicago’s
seventy-fifth and ninety-fifth percentiles decline from 0.70 to 0.67, and 0.81 to 0.75, respectively; Indianapolis’
ninety-fifth percentile declines from 0.80 to 0.79; Phoenix’s seventy-fifth percentile declines from 0.49 to 0.47;
and Salt Lake City’s ninety-fifth percentile declines from 0.55 to 0.51. Even in those cities, the rest of the distribution shifts upward considerably. For example, Chicago’s median correlation rises from 0.55 to 0.63; Indianapolis’
seventy-fifth percentile rises from 0.49 to 0.59; Phoenix’s median rises from 0.37 to 0.42; and Salt Lake City’s
seventy-fifth percentile rises from 0.33 to 0.51.
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Table 1—Distributions of Correlations in House Price Growth across MSAs

Correlation

Weighting scheme
Average
5th percentile
25th percentile
50th percentile
75th percentile
95th percentile
Average difference:
95th–75th percentile
Average interquartile range
Average difference:
25th–5th percentile

Five-year
growth
rates

One-year growth rates of real house prices

Population
Unweighted weighted

Migration weighted
Conditional
Average on house
migration price growth During During
rates
differences booms
busts

Average
migration
rates

0.34
−0.17
0.15
0.35
0.54
0.82

0.37
−0.16
0.18
0.39
0.58
0.86

0.57
−0.02
0.34
0.60
0.89
0.97

0.55
−0.004
0.36
0.58
0.79
0.96

0.59
0.04
0.44
0.64
0.80
0.96

0.56
−0.05
0.32
0.60
0.84
0.97

0.64
−0.06
0.44
0.74
0.94
0.99

0.26

0.23

0.08

0.14

0.12

0.15

0.07

0.37
0.27

0.35
0.27

0.37
0.33

0.20
0.39

0.16
0.31

0.15
0.33

0.41
0.45

Notes: This table reports the distribution of weighted average house price growth correlations across MSAs. MSA
k’s weighted average correlation is between its real house price growth and that in all other MSAs, with weights varied as listed in the table. Correlations are constant over time within MSA pairs, but the weights can vary over time.
A ‘boom’ is an MSA × year when nominal house price growth in MSA k was positive; a ‘bust’ is an MSA × year
when nominal house price growth was negative or zero.

top three quartiles of the distributions shift by more than the bottom quartiles, with
Austin and Seattle being representative examples.
To illustrate the range of the effective expected correlations in real annual house
price growth, Table 1 presents the distributions of the correlations across MSA-pairs.
To convert the raw correlations to expected correlations, we weight each MSA-pair
observation by the imputed probability of a household moving between those two
MSAs. For comparison, the first column of Table 1 assumes that households have
an equal probability of moving across any MSA-pair. This column corresponds to
Figure 1, but with all MSAs pooled together. In the equally-weighted case, the average pairwise correlation is just 0.34.5 However, 25 percent of the MSA-pairs have
correlations of at least 0.54. Column 2 uses population-weighted correlations, where
the probability of a household moving to an MSA, conditional on moving at all, is
proportional to that MSA’s share of the total population in all MSAs. This assumption makes little difference relative to column 1: The median correlation rises from
0.35 to 0.39 and the ninety-fifth percentile correlation rises from 0.82 to 0.86.
The expected correlation in house price growth rises considerably across the distribution when we recognize that households tend to move between highly covarying MSAs. In column 3, we weight the MSA-pair correlations by the actual rate
at which households moved between them, computed using the US Treasury’s

5

We use equal weights for consistency with prior research. See, for example, Glaeser and Gyourko (2006).
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county-to-county migration data described above. This column corresponds to
Figure 2. Using the migration weights, the average correlation rises to 0.57 from
0.34 in column 1, and the median correlation rises to 0.60 from 0.35. An even more
striking finding is that the seventy-fifth percentile correlation rises from 0.54 to
0.89—i.e., 25 percent of household moves are between MSAs that have correlations
in annual house price growth of 0.89 or above. Even the lower end of the distribution
has remarkably high correlations. The twenty-fifth percentile correlation in column
3, 0.34, is about the same as the median correlation in column 1.
Overall, accounting for where households actually move shifts the entire distribution of expected correlations to the right. This conclusion is confirmed in the bottom
panel of Table 1 which reports various summary statistics for the (within-MSA)
distribution of correlations. When MSA-pairs are weighted by migration flows, the
difference between the ninety-fifth and seventy-fifth percentile correlations within
each MSA shrinks dramatically, from 0.26 in column 1 to 0.08 in column 3, because
the distribution is capped at 1.0 as it shifts to the right. Thus, the seventy-fifth percentile value rises considerably, but the ninety-fifth percentile cannot rise by as much.
However, neither the interquartile range nor the difference between the twenty-fifth
and fifth percentiles changes much between columns 1 and 3, indicating that the
other points in the distribution increase in near-lockstep.
The next three columns of Table 1 show that the propensity to move between
highly-covarying MSAs is not driven by relative house price changes in those markets.
In the fourth column, we adjust the cross-MSA mobility rates by regressing the moving
rate between a MSA-pair in a given year on the difference between the two MSAs in
annual house price growth over the prior year, that difference squared, and a constant
term. We then use the residuals from that regression, plus the constant term, as the moving weights.6 If moving patterns were determined by where households could afford
to move rather than where they wished to move, controlling for relative house price
growth should affect the expected correlations. Instead, the basic pattern of results is
little changed from the one using the unadjusted moving rates, in the third column. The
median expected covariance is 0.58 and the ninety-fifth percentile is 0.96. Although the
seventy-fifth percentile covariance drops from 0.89 to 0.79, it is still considerably larger
than for the unweighted or population-weighted moves in the first two columns.
In the fifth and sixth columns, we check whether the moving patterns are different in periods of house price growth or decline. They do not appear to be. The fifth
column restricts the sample to MSAs in years where they had experienced positive
nominal house price growth (“booms”). The sixth column restricts the sample to
MSAs in years where they did not (“busts”). In both cases, the basic pattern of
results is little changed from column 3.
Finally, we also compute correlations in five-year house price growth rates, rather
than annual growth rates, to try to more closely match the average household’s holding period for its house. As in column 3, we use raw household mobility patterns
6
This is akin to setting the difference in price growth between the two MSAs to zero. Negative predicted moving
rates are truncated at zero. While the estimated coefficients on the price difference terms are statistically significant
and of an intuitive sign—households are less likely to move to an MSA whose price growth was higher than their
own, and that effect accelerates as the price growth gap gets bigger—the magnitude is economically small and the
R2is just 0.0013.
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Figure 3. The Distributions of House Price Growth Correlations across Housing
Markets, by Probability of Moving

as the weights in forming expected correlations. The distribution of expected
correlations, reported in the last column, rises across the board since using the
longer-difference growth rates reduces the effect of high-frequency fluctuations or
noise in house prices. Seventy-five percent of households have house price correlations of at least 0.44, 50 percent have correlations of at least 0.74, and 25 percent of
households have correlations of 0.94 or more. Our ability to compute growth rates
over even longer horizons is limited because of the length of the sample. However,
the distribution using ten-year growth rates in house prices looks very similar to that
reported in the last column of Table 1.
The reason that the expected correlation in house price growth rises when we
account for households’ moving tendencies is that the relation between household
moves and house price correlation is skewed. The set of city pairs with high gross
migration flows includes mostly city pairs with high price correlations, whereas
the city pairs with low gross migration flows include both low and high correlation
pairs. This pattern can be seen in Figure 3, which graphs the kernel density of the
correlations in annual house price growth among various subsets of the 18,090 pairs
of the 135 cities. The solid black line restricts the sample to the 4,812 city pairs that,
according to the US Treasury data, experienced no (gross) migration. A few of these
pairs had correlations below −0.5, some had correlations of nearly one, and the peak
of the distribution is around 0.3. The dashed line shows the kernel density of the correlations for the remaining city pairs that experience positive gross migration. This
distribution is slightly to the right of the distribution for city pairs with no migration,
so on average households who move migrate between more highly correlated housing markets, but the overall difference is small. By contrast, the dotted line considers
only those city pairs (A, B) where, of the households who moved out of city A, at
least 1 percent moved to city B. One percent of moving households is a high moving rate, since most city pairs have few moves. The distribution of correlations shifts
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considerably to the right. That rightward shift is even more pronounced for the dashdot line, which restricts the set of city pairs to those where the rate of moving out of
A to B was at least 2.5 percent. These last two kernel densities indicate that the rate
of moving is high mainly between high-correlation city pairs.
The patterns in Figure 3 explain the differences between Figures 1 and 2. When
city pairs are equally weighted, the distribution of correlations looks like the solid
and dashed lines. But when city pairs are weighted by the probability of a household
moving between the two cities, the pairs represented by the solid line get no weight,
while the pairs represented by the dotted and dash-dot distributions get significant
weight. This reweighting shifts the mass of the correlation distribution (in most cities) to the right.
Investigating why MSAs have correlated house price growth rates—or why
households tend to move between MSAs with correlated housing markets—is
beyond the scope of this paper. Indeed, the value, to an individual household, of
owning a house as a hedge against moving risk is separable from the reasons for the
correlation or the potential move. For example, one possible reason for moving is
that the shocks that induce the correlation in prices also induce labor market flows.
That is, cities that are similar enough for households to want to move between are
also likely to share the same economic fundamentals, leading to a correlation in their
housing markets. Another possible reason is that cities with correlated house prices
are demand substitutes (McDuff 2011). In either case, for an individual household,
owning a house still helps hedge the purchase price risk in the city that is moved
to. Nonetheless, in our empirical section, below, we will confirm this conclusion by
using exogenous predictors of cross-MSA mobility to form expected correlations
and covariances.
II. An Application of Expected Covariances to Housing Demand:
Theoretical Framework

In the remainder of this paper, we provide an application of our estimates of the
expected covariance in house price growth. Specifically, we examine whether the
hedging benefit from owning a house whose value covaries positively with housing costs in likely future cities increases the demand for home owning. We start by
outlining a simple theory that illustrates how owning a house can hedge against the
house price risk from future moves, and why that hedging benefit might increase
the demand for home owning. This illustration will also provide guidance for the
empirical tests that follow.
The theory behind the hedging value of home owning has been discussed in several
prior papers—such as Ortalo-Magné and Rady (2002), Sinai and Souleles (2005),
and Han (2010)—with varying degrees of generality. Our exposition generally follows Sinai and Souleles (2005), in which house prices are endogenous, but rents,
incomes, housing quantity, and households’ moving decisions and location choices
are exogenous. The model also abstracts from some other important issues, such as
leverage and down payment requirements, portfolio allocation, taxes, and moving
costs. We make these simplifications to focus the model on the concept of the moving hedge—they are not intended to minimize the importance of other factors in
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housing demand and housing risk. Many of those other factors have been examined
in prior work, such as leverage (Stein 1995, Cocco 2000, Hurst and Stafford 2004,
Lustig and Van Nieuwerburgh 2005), the potential correlation of labor income and
house prices (Davidoff 2006), endogenous quantity (Han 2010), portfolio implications (Flavin and Yamashita 2002; Piazessi, Schneider, and Tuzel 2007), and endogenous initial location choice and portfolio allocation (Ortalo-Magné and Prat 2010),
and would operate in addition to the hedging benefit that is the focus of this paper.7
Since our focus is on demonstrating how owning a house in one city can hedge
against house price volatility in the next city, we will consider a representative
household who initially lives in some city, A, and then moves to another city, B. To
simplify, we assume that the household knows with certainty that it will live in A,
and then in B, for N years each, after which it will die. (In our empirical work, we
will recognize that N can vary across households, with some expecting to not move
very often and others expecting to move more frequently, and that there are multiple destination cities to which households could move.) At birth, labeled year 0,
the household chooses whether to be a homeowner in both locations or a renter in
both locations.8 The household chooses its tenure mode to maximize its expected
utility of wealth net of total housing costs, or equivalently to minimize its total
risk-adjusted housing costs.
The cost of obtaining a year’s worth of housing services is the rent, denoted by  ˜r  tA  
in city A in year t, and r
 ˜    tB  in city B. The tildes denote that the rent in year t is not known
at time zero, because rents fluctuate due to shocks to underlying housing demand
and supply. To allow for correlation in rents (and, endogenously, in house prices)
across cities, we assume that rents in the two locations follow correlated AR(1) pror  Bn   = μB  + φr  Bn−1+ k(ρη  An   + η  Bn  ),
cesses: 
r  nA   = μA  + φr  nA−1+ k(η  An   + ρη  Bn  ) and 
where φ ∈ [0, 1] measures the persistence of rents, μ
 Aand μBmeasure the expected
level or growth rate of rents (depending on φ), and the shocks ηAand ηBare independently distributed IID(0, σ  2A)  and IID(0, σ  2B)  . ρ parameterizes the spatial c orrelation
in rents (and in house prices) across the two locations, with ρ = 0 implying
independence and ρ = 1 implying perfect correlation. To control the total magnitude of housing shocks incurred as ρ varies, the scaling constant κ can be set to
 . For simplicity in this exposition, we will set the persistence term
1/(1 + ρ2)1/2
φ to 0. We find similar qualitative results with the more realistic assumption of
φ > 0 (Case and Shiller 1989).
From a homeowner’s perspective, the lifetime ex post cost of owning, discounted
˜   AN   ) − δ2N
  ˜   BN     −   P
 P
  ˜   B2N . The P  A0   term is the initial purto year 0, is CO≡ P  A0   + δN ( P
˜   B2Nis the uncertain
chase price in city A, which is known at time 0. In the last term,  P
residual value of the house in B at the time of death. It is discounted since death
7
It is worth noting that theoretical papers that relax many of our more restrictive assumptions still yield similar
qualitative implications. For example, Ortalo-Magné and Prat (2010), which in part generalizes the theoretical
concepts in Ortalo-Magné and Rady (2002) and Sinai and Souleles (2005) to allow for multiple locations, a full
portfolio decision, correlation between income and house prices, and endogenous leverage, still predicts that the
hedging benefit of homeownership would have a positive effect on housing demand.
8
The desired quantity of housing services is normalized to be one unit in each location. For convenience, rental units
and owner-occupied units, in fixed supply and together equal to the number of households, both provide one unit of
housing services. The results below can be generalized to allow the services from an owner-occupied house to exceed
those from renting, perhaps due to agency problems. Additional extensions are discussed in Sinai and Souleles (2005).
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occurs 2N years in the future. Our emphasis in this paper is on the middle term,
˜   AN   ), which is the difference between the sale price of the house in A at
  ˜   BN     −   P
δN ( P
time N and the purchase price of the house in B at time N.9
For renters, the ex post cost of renting is the present value of the annual rents paid:
N−1

2N−1

n=1

n=N

 	
CR ≡ r  A0   + ∑  δn r
 ˜  An   + ∑  δn  r
˜  nB    .
Sinai and Souleles (2005) derive house prices in this setting assuming they
endogenously adjust to leave households indifferent between owning and renting.
The resulting price in city A, P  A0  , can be expressed as the expected present value of
future rents, PV(r  0A  ), plus the total risk premium the household is willing to pay to
own rather than to rent:
(πR − πO )
δN (π  BR  − π  BO  )
_
(1)	
P  A0   = PV(r  0A  ) +  _
  
 
−  
   .
1 − δN 
1 − δN 
In the second term, the risk premium for owning, π
 O, measures the risk asso   A0   in
ciated with the cost C
 O of owning, which in equilibrium reduces the price P
equation (1), ceteris paribus. The risk premium for renting, πR, measures the risk
   A0  ,
associated with the cost C
 R  of renting. Since owning avoids this risk, πR increases P
A
B
B
B
ceteris paribus. P
   0  also capitalizes Δπ ≡ (π  R  − π  O  ), a net risk premium for renting versus owning in B that in equilibrium P  A0  inherits from house prices in B.
For owners, πOmeasures the total house price risk from the three future housing
transactions; i.e., the sale of the first house in A, and the purchase price and subsequent sale price of the second house in B:
α
(2)	
πO ≡  _  [ δ 2Nκ2(1 − ρ )2( s  2A  + s  2B   ) +  δ4N( s  2B   )  ]  ,
2
where s  2A   ≡ var(rA ) and s  2B   ≡ var(rB ) are the variance of rents in cities A and B,
respectively, and α is household risk aversion. Since house prices are endogenously
related to rents (as in equation (1)), house price volatility follows from rent volatility. Thus we can use s   2A  and s   2B  to measure the underlying housing market volatility.10
9
A capital gains tax, τ, on house price appreciation in A would create a wedge between the sale price in A and
purchase price in B, reducing the effective covariance by a factor of (1 − τ). In the United States, however, τ is
small. Since 1997, housing capital gains have been essentially untaxed since homeowners can exclude $500,000
of gains on their primary residence from tax if married, and $250,000 if single. Prior to 1997, homeowners faced
capital gains tax at the time of the sale but could roll over the gain into their next house to the extent that the purchase price exceeded the basis of the old house and the new house was purchased within two years of the prior sale.
This enabled most households to effectively avoid the tax. Even a home owner that did not “trade up” to a more
expensive house could receive a one-time $125,000 capital gains exclusion if over the age of 55. (The exclusion
was lower, and the minimum age higher, before 1981). Prior research has found that household mobility and the rate
of house sales increased when the capital gains tax exclusion was expanded in 1997 (Cunningham and Engelhardt
2008; Shan 2011) In our empirical work, we will condition on household mobility and instead identify our results
based on where households are likely to move.
10
If ρ > 0, the variance of observed rents in a given city includes the contribution of the underlying housing
2
market shocks η from the other city as well: s  2A  = κ  2(σ  2A  + ρ  2σ  2B  ) and s  2B  = κ  2(σ  B
  + ρ  2σ  2A  ). In the symmetric
2
2
2
2
2
2
case with σ  A  = σ  B  = σ  , then s  A  = s  B  = σ  , independent of ρ. With φ = 0 in equation (2), the price risks come
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In the final term in equation (2), s  2B  reflects the risk associated with the sale of the
house in B, discounted by δ(2N)2since it takes place in year 2N.
The first term in equation (2) reflects the net risk from the sell-in-A and buy-in-B
transactions in year N, i.e., the risk associated with the difference between the pur˜   AN   ). The net risk depends on the correlation ρ
  ˜   BN     −   P
chase price and sale proceeds ( P
between house prices in A and B. The part of the first term inside the square brackets
( 1 − ρ )  2
can be written as δ2Nf (ρ )( s  2A  + s  2B   ), with f (ρ ) ≡ κ2(1 − ρ )2 =  _
. If prices in
2
1 + ρ  

the two markets are uncorrelated, with ρ = 0, then f (ρ ) = 1, so the net risk from
the two transactions is simply the sum of the risks of the individual transactions
( s  2A  + s  2B   ), appropriately discounted. But as the two markets become increasingly
correlated, the net risk declines. That is, owning the house in A helps to hedge against
the uncertainty of the purchase in B. In the polar case when ρ = 1, then f (ρ ) = 0,
and so the sale and subsequent purchase fully net out. By contrast, if the prices in the
two markets are perfectly negatively correlated, with ρ = −1, then f (ρ ) = 2, and
the net risk is twice as large as the sum of the individual risks.
Since f (ρ ) is monotonically decreasing in ρ, in our empirical work it will be useful to use the approximation
α
(3)	
πO  ≈  _  [ −δ2Ncov(A, B ) + δ4N( s  2B   )  ],
2
where cov(A, B ) is the covariance of rents (and prices) in A and B. The risk premium
from owning should decline with this covariance.
For renters, uncertainty comes from not having locked-in the future price of housing services, so the risk of renting is proportional to the discounted sum of the corresponding rent shocks:

(

)

α
(4)	
πR  ≡  _   s  2A   ∑  δ2n + s  2B  ∑  δ2n .
2
n=N
n=1
2N−1

N−1

Turning to the remaining terms in equation (1), the net risk premium in B that
is capitalized into P
   A0  analogously depends on the net risk of owning versus renting
while living in B:
(5)

(

)

α
(π  BR  − π  BO  ) ≈  _ s  2B    ∑  ( δn  )2 − ( δN  )2 .
2
n=1
N−1

Finally, the present value of expected rents in A increases with the trend μA :
(6)

(

)

δ
PV(r  0A  ) ≡  r  0A   + μA   _  .
1−δ

A B
B
B
B
from the contemporaneous rent shocks: η  A
N  on P  N,  η  N  on P  N,  and η  2Non P  2N. With φ > 0, the prices would also
include the persistent effect of the preceding rent shocks (see Sinai and Souleles 2005).
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Generalizing this framework to a setting with heterogeneous households, P  A0  can
be thought of as reflecting a household’s latent demand for owning. If the household’s willingness-to-pay is above the market-clearing house price determined by
the marginal homebuyer, the household would own, otherwise it would rent. In our
empirical work, we observe the own/rent decision but not latent demand. We will
control nonparametrically for differences across MSAs in the clearing prices for
houses, by including MSA × year fixed effects, and will allow for heterogeneity
across households (in particular in N and ρ). This approach allows us to map our
empirical results on the determinants of the tenure decision to inferences about the
latent demand for homeownership.
This framework yields several empirical predictions. First, as the covariance in
house prices between cities A and B rises, a household living in A should be more
likely to own its house. By equation (3), the risk of owning declines with the covariance, because the house acts as a hedge. Thus the demand for owning and the price
P  A0  should increase with the covariance, ceteris paribus.
It is important to note that this first prediction applies to exogenous moves.
Endogenous moves raise the possibility that there is an option value to owning
a house, which in theory could generate the opposite effect of covariance on the
demand for home owning. If a household owns a house in city A and prices fall
relative to house prices in city B, the household could choose not to move and continue to consume the same housing services. However, if house prices in city A rise
relative to house prices in city B, the household could sell its house in A and use the
proceeds to purchase more housing in B. In that example, the option to move potentially is valuable, and would be more valuable when the house prices in the origin
city covaried less with possible future cities. Thus the option value of moving would
imply that the demand for owning would increase as expected covariance fell. Of
course, exogenous and endogenous reasons for moving are not mutually exclusive.
Any given household presumably has some probability of a forced (exogenous)
move and some desire to have the opportunity to expand its housing consumption
(endogenous move). We focus the empirical analysis that follows on exogenous
moves by using exogenous household characteristics to predict the probability of
moving and the destination conditional on a move.11
The second empirical prediction of the model is that the hedging value should
diminish as the likelihood of moving falls. As a household’s expected length of stay,
N, in city A increases, the net price risk in equation (3) is expected to occur further
in the future and thus is discounted more heavily. That is, in making its tenure decision a household who expects to be mobile (small N ) should be more sensitive to
11
Our econometric analysis represents a joint test that the benefit from hedging the risk from exogenous moves
exceeds the loss from a reduced option to move on average, and that our model matches actual consumer choice. Our
prior is that the hedging benefit exceeds the value of the option, and our empirical results support this view. First,
the cross-MSA moves that we study seem unlikely to be motivated by changing housing consumption because it
would be easier to adjust the quantity of housing consumed by moving within MSA. Second, as reported in Section I,
households tend to move between covarying MSAs. If their motivation was to exercise an option, they would move
between uncorrelated MSAs. Third, Paciorek and Sinai (2012) report that the distribution of where households move,
conditional on moving, changes little over time. Again, that pattern is consistent with a relatively stable, exogenous
distribution of preferred destinations. In any case, as discussed below our empirical results imply that the average
benefit from hedging the risk from exogenous moves exceeds the loss from a reduced option to move.
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the moving-hedge benefit of owning, since its move will occur sooner and thus the
net price risk will be larger in present value, ceteris paribus. Conversely, a household
who expects it will never move has no need to worry about future housing markets.
Thus the model predicts that the demand for owning should decline with the interaction of N and cov(A, B).12
These cross-market implications operate in addition to the within-market implications already empirically established in Sinai and Souleles (2005). The key implication tested in that paper is that the effect of local rent volatility s  2A  on demand
generally increases with the horizon (N ). Households with longer expected horizons
are exposed to a larger number of rent shocks (in πR), whereas the expected sale
price risk (in π
 O ) comes further in the future and hence is discounted more heavily.
Thus the demand for owning should increase with the interaction of N and s   2A —an
implication that Sinai and Souleles confirm empirically. Here we focus instead on
the cross-market implications described above.
III. Data

We use household level data from the 1980, 1990, and 2000 waves of the Integrated
Public Use Microsample of the US Census (IPUMS) as our base dataset. The IPUMS
is a representative cross-section sample of US residents drawn from the decennial
census. It is well-suited for our purpose because it has many observations (in the
5 percent sample that we use, there are nearly 38 million person-level observations
in total in the three waves), contains MSA identifiers, reports whether households
own their homes, and provides a host of household-level income and demographic
characteristics that we use as controls. We construct two subsamples from this data
using the procedure outlined in online Appendix Table A1. Both subsamples are
restricted to household heads age 25 and over, among other conditions. One sample,
which we call the “migration” subsample, excludes the households from the 1980
census that due to the design of that year’s census were not asked about prior residences. After these restrictions, 10.3 million h ousehold-level observations remain.
The other sample, which we call the “regression” sample, excludes households who
either do not live in an MSA or live in MSAs that are not covered in our other
datasets (as well as other, relatively minor, sample restrictions), for a net total of
4.2 million household-level observations.
The other variables of interest—the expected covariances (cov), rent risks (s  2r  ),
and expected lengths-of-stay (N  )—need to be imputed into the IPUMS. The
expected covariance for a household living in MSA k is comprised of two parts:
the vector of house price covariances between MSA k and the other MSAs l, and
the probability weights that a given household (of group g) living in MSA k would
A
These results generalize to the case when φ > 0. First, P  A
0   still increases with ρ, ∂ P  0  /∂ρ > 0. This is because
B
B
2
∂ π0/∂ρ remains negative, and(π  R  − π  O  )is independent of ρ given s  B.  When φ > 0, πR
  is no longer independent of ρ, but ∂ πR
 /∂ρ is positive. That is, a higher covariance also increases the amount of rent risk, which reinforces (though for realistic parameters is quantitatively smaller than) the effect of the reduced price risk due to
  2 A
∂ π0 /∂ρ < 0. Second, ∂ P  A
0  /∂ρ generally declines with N (i.e., the interaction term ∂  P  0  /∂ρ∂ N < 0) for realistic
parameters, and when N is not too small (N > 3).
12
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apply to the likelihood of moving to each of the other MSAs: E( cov(PA, PB ))k,g
= ∑ l   wk, l, g  cov(Pk, Pl). The house price covariance vector, cov(Pk, Pl), is constructed
by computing the covariance of real annual house price growth over the 1980–2005
period based on the OFHEO index described earlier.
We use several different approaches to estimate the moving weights, w
 k, l, g. The
IPUMS reports each household’s current MSA of residence and their MSA of
residence five years earlier. Using the migration sample, we construct the average
annual rate of moving from each MSA to each of the other MSAs conditional on
moving out of the origin MSA, weighting the observations by the IPUMS household
weights. We also repeat the weighting exercise allowing the MSA-to-MSA moving
matrix to differ by group, g. As groups, we use the census’ 381 detailed industries
(1990 definition) as well as the census’ 243 detailed occupations (1990 definition).
When we allow the weights to vary by MSA and group, E( cov( PA , PB   ))  k ,g varies
both across and within MSAs.
Because the weights condition on moving out of the MSA, the expected covariance excludes the potential hedging benefit of homeownership for within-MSA
moves. In the empirical analysis, we will consider within-MSA moving separately.
Our baseline specification will include a control for the probability of moving within
the MSA, and the robustness section of the paper will explore this issue further. To
preview our rationale, in our baseline specification we are reluctant to assume that
within-MSA moves should be restricted to have the same effect on housing demand
as cross-MSA moves. In addition, we cannot estimate the expected covariance in
house prices within an MSA since we do not know the distribution of locations
within a given city that a household might move between, and not all parts of a metropolitan area necessarily appreciate at the same rate.
We construct expected horizon and rent volatility in the same manner as Sinai
and Souleles (2005). We proxy for the expected horizon with the probability of not
moving, imputed using exogenous demographic characteristics. The IPUMS reports
whether a household has moved in the last year. To generate the expected probability
of moving, we take the average rate of moving over the last year in the age (in tenyear bins) × marital status × occupation cell that matches the household in question (excluding the household from the cell). We subtract that average from one to
obtain the probability of staying, Pr(stay). This is our proxy for the expected horizon
N. In the regression analysis, we will control separately for age, marital status, and
occupation in the vector of demographic controls, so the probability of staying will
be identified from the interaction of these three variables, i.e., from households having a different mobility profile over their lifetimes depending on their marital status
and occupation.
To estimate rent volatility, we use data from REIS, a commercial real estate
data provider that has surveyed “Class A” apartment buildings in 44 major markets
between 1980 and the present. We use their measure of average effective rents by
MSA, deflated using the CPI less shelter. To estimate the volatility, we detrend the
log annual average real rent in each MSA and compute the standard deviation of
the deviations from the trend between 1980 and 2002. By using logs, the standard
deviation is calculated as a percent of the rent and so the measured rent risk is not
affected by the level or average growth rate of rents.
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Key summary statistics from the combined dataset are reported in Appendix
Table A2.
IV. Application to Housing Demand: Estimation Strategy and Results

We wish to estimate the following regression, for household i in MSA k at time t:
(7)

OWNi, k, t = β0 + β1  f (sr )k + β2  g(N)i + β3  f (sr )k × g(N)i

 	

β5  E( cov(PA , PB ))  1/2
+ β4  E( cov(PA , PB))  1/2
i, k + 
i, k × g(N)i

 	

+ θXi + ψZk, t + ζt + εi, k, t  ,

where “OWN” is an indicator variable for homeownership, sr is the measure of
the local rent volatility, N is the imputed probability of not moving (Pr(stay)), and
E( cov(PA , PB ))1/2is the square root of the household’s expected covariance in house
prices. Our rationale for using the covariance in house price rather than the covariance of the underlying economic fundamental, rent, is a pragmatic one. We have
both house price and migration data for 119 MSAs but rent data for just 44 MSAs.
We can use the full set of 119 MSAs to construct the expected covariance if we use
the price covariances.
The remaining variables in equation (7) are controls: X is a vector of householdlevel characteristics, Z controls for time-varying MSA-level characteristics, and ζ is
a vector of year dummies. We will estimate equation (5) using OLS and linear IV.
The main predictions from the framework in Section II are that β3 > 0, β4 > 0,
 3 > 0
and β5 < 0. The tests of β4 > 0 and β5 < 0 are novel to this paper, while β
was tested in Sinai and Souleles (2005) using a different dataset. The framework
in Section I also shows that the probability of owning should increase with the
horizon N, which implies that β2  > 0. In practice the coefficient on the uninteracted
horizon term can also pick up the effects of other factors affecting the probability
of owning, such as fixed costs being amortized over longer stays, and so we will
not emphasize β2. Also, we will include MSA × year dummies, which will subsume the effect of β
 1, the coefficient on the uninteracted rent volatility. Sinai and
Souleles (2005) estimated β1to be negative, which is consistent both with the theory
in that paper and Section II of this paper.13 In preliminary analysis, our estimates of
β1generally replicated those in Sinai and Souleles (2005) despite the difference in
datasets, so we treat β
 1as a nuisance parameter in this paper.
Most of our empirical focus will be on identifying the estimates of β4and β5.
One way to identify β
 4, the effect of the expected covariance on the decision to
own, is to make use of the fact that different types of households within each MSA
can have different weights applied to the MSA × MSA house price covariance
matrix, reflecting their different probabilities of moving to different MSAs. This
yields v ariation in expected covariances within and across MSA. Since we allow
13
More recently, the theoretical and calibration results of Ortalo-Magné and Prat (2010) and Hizmo (2010) also
suggest that housing demand should decline with the volatility of the housing market.
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the moving weights to differ by industry or occupation groups, the resulting variation is at the industry × MSA or the occupation × MSA level. Thus we can include
MSA × year dummies and a complete set of industry or occupation dummies, and
still identify β
 4. If we assume instead that all households within an MSA have the
same probabilities of moving to the other MSAs, β4cannot be separately identified
from the MSA × year fixed effects.
To illustrate, we could compare the homeownership rates of electricians and lawyers in Philadelphia since those two industry groups, despite living in the same
MSA, are likely to move to different cities and thus have different expected covariances. We can then compare the difference in the two groups’ homeownership
rates to the difference in homeownership rates in the same two industry groups in
another city, such as Seattle, who themselves have different expected covariances.
The fact that households may be on average more likely to own their houses in
Seattle or Philadelphia is absorbed with MSA × year dummies. Any capitalization
of the value of the moving hedge into house prices is also captured by these fixed
effects. Average differences in homeownership rates across industries can be controlled for with industry dummies. Thus our estimate of β
 4would be identified by
industry × MSA variation. Our identification strategy generalizes this example to
all MSAs and all industries. We also try a similar strategy using occupation groups
rather than industries. We allow for general nonindependence of the standard errors
within industry × MSA × year (or occupation × MSA × year) groups by clustering the standard errors.
We can identify β5separately from β4, since β5is the coefficient on the interaction
between the probability of staying (N ) and the E( cov(PA, PB ))1/2term. Whether or
not the expected covariance term alone turns out to be empirically distinguishable
from unobserved MSA heterogeneity, the probability of staying varies across households i based on their demographic characteristics, so E( cov(PA , PB ))  1/2
i,k   × g(N)i
varies by household within MSA. The same logic applies to the identification of β3,
the coefficient on f (sr )k × g(N)i, since the interaction of the MSA level rent variance and the group-level probability of staying provides MSA × group variation.
In addition to the variables of interest, in all regressions we control for standard
household-level covariates: the (uninteracted) imputed Pr(stay), log real family
income, age dummies (in ten-year bins), indicator variables for marital status (single, married, widowed, and divorced), education dummies (less than high school,
high school, some college, and completed college), 381 occupation dummies, and
the probability of moving within the MSA conditional on moving. We add 243
industry dummies when we use industry for the group g in forming the moving
weights. MSA-level covariates and aggregate time series effects are subsumed by
the MSA × year fixed effects, which we include in all specifications.
As a baseline, the first column of Table 2 uses the average MSA-to-MSA mobility
rates by occupation to construct the moving probabilities, so E( cov(PA , PB ))1/2 varies both across and within MSAs. The predictions from Section 2 are supported by
the data. In column 1, the first row reports the effect of the expected price covariance
on the likelihood of owning (β4 ) and the second row reports how the effect changes
as the probability of staying increases (β5). Because the specification includes an
interaction term with Pr(stay), the coefficient in the first row can be interpreted as
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Table 2—The Relationship between Expected House Price Covariance
and the Probability of Owning (OLS)

 
E[cov(PA, PB )]1/2
P(stay)i× E[cov(PA , PB )]1/2
 
P(stay)i× sr
P(stay)i
Probability weights for E[cov(PA, PB )]:
MSA × year dummies?
Adjusted R2
Clustering of standard errors

(1)

2.042
(0.252)
−2.039
(0.283)
2.430
(0.140)
0.887
(0.019)

(2)

1.950
(0.265)
−2.016
(0.292)
2.468
(0.152)
0.870
(0.019)

(3)

−2.135
(0.151)
2.464
(0.081)
0.889
(0.010)

MSA ×
occupation
Yes

MSA ×
industry
Yes

MSA

0.2965

0.2993

0.2964
None

MSA ×
year ×
occupation

MSA ×
year ×
industry

Yes
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(4)

(5)

0.367
(0.099)

0.298
(0.115)

1.856
(0.130)
0.838
(0.017)

1.902
(0.143)
0.821
(0.016)

MSA ×
occupation
Yes

MSA ×
industry
Yes

0.2965

MSA ×
year ×
occupation

0.2993

MSA ×
year ×
industry

Notes: N = 3,326,113. Sample period covers the 1980, 1990, and 2000 censuses. The dependent variable is an indicator variable that takes the value of one if the respondent owns its home and zero if the respondent rents. The probability of staying (not moving), Pr(stay), is imputed using occupation × marital status × age category cells. The
square root of the expected covariance of house prices, E[cov(PA, PB )]1/2
 , is a moving-probability weighted average
of the covariances between the MSA of residence and possible future MSAs. The standard deviation of detrended
log rent, s r  , is a MSA (k) characteristic and is subsumed by the MSA × year dummies. The standard deviations
and covariances are not time-varying. All regressions include as covariates: MSA × year dummies, age dummies,
occupation dummies, marital status dummies, education dummies, log real family income, and the share of moving
households who remain in the MSA. Columns 2 and 5 add a detailed set of industry dummies.

the effect of the covariance for the polar case household who expects to move right
away. We find that such a household is more likely to own when the covariance is
greater, as predicted. The estimated coefficient β4of 2.042 (0.252 standard error)
implies that a one standard deviation increase in the square root of the expected
covariance (0.015 on a base of 0.041) would yield a 3.1 percent increase in the
probability of homeownership (2.04 × 0.015). This represents a sizeable increase
in the ownership rate (the average is 65.4 percent), though a small fraction of the
cross-sectional standard deviation in the likelihood of owning (the standard deviation is 47.6 percent). However, this extrapolation to an expected horizon of zero
years is well outside of the variation in the sample.
To assess the effect for households with a longer expected horizon, we need to
turn to the interaction term, Pr(stay) × E( cov(PA, PB ))1/2, in the second row. The
negative estimated coefficient for β
 5 of −2.039 (0.283) implies that the effect of
house price covariance on the probability of owning attenuates as a household’s
expected horizon increases and the value of the moving-hedge falls, again as predicted. Since the estimated coefficient on the interaction term is of similar magnitude but opposite sign to the coefficient on E( cov(PA , PB ))1/2, the net effect of
higher covariance declines to effectively zero for the polar case household who is
imputed to never move, i.e., whose Pr(stay) = 1. This result, too, is consistent with
the framework in Section I, since nonmovers have no need for a moving hedge.
To be precise, the estimates show that households with short expected durations
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and high expected covariances are more likely to own their houses than otherwise
equivalent households with short expected durations and low expected covariances
in the same MSA and year. As the expected duration increases, the gap in the probability of ownership declines to zero.
We can combine the estimates for these two polar cases to estimate the effect of a
one standard deviation higher expected covariance on the probability of owning for
households with an intermediate expected duration. For a household with the lowest
expected horizon in the sample, two years (imputed Pr(stay) = 0.5), a one standard
deviation higher expected covariance raises the probability of owning by 1.6 percentage
points (0.2 percentage points standard error), which is a large and significant effect.
Households with a longer, five-year expected horizon (with Pr(stay) = 0.8, approximately the sample average), are 0.63 percentage points (0.15) more likely to own
a house when the expected covariance rises by one standard deviation. By the time
households have a one-in-ten chance of moving in any given year (Pr(stay) = 0.9),
the effect on the probability of owning approaches zero (0.32 percentage points) and
is barely statistically significant (a standard error of 0.16).
In the third row of Table 2, the effect of rent volatility in the current MSA on the
likelihood of owning (β3) becomes more positive as the horizon increases, since the
coefficient on the interaction term, Pr(stay) × sr  , is positive. This interaction effect
was one of the main empirical results in Sinai and Souleles (2005), and it is robust
throughout all the specifications in this paper.
We include Pr(stay) separately to control for expected horizon and related factors
like the fixed costs of buying or selling a house. The estimated coefficient is positive
as expected: households with longer expected lengths of stay on average are more
likely to own.
The second column of Table 2 reports the estimated coefficients when we impute
the pattern of where households expect to move based on industry groups and MSA.
The results are very similar to those using occupation groups.
In the third column, we eliminate the within-MSA group-based variation by
imputing mobility based on where other households in the same MSA move.
Because the weighting matrix in this specification varies only by MSA, the estimated coefficients on the uninteracted expected covariance and rent volatility terms
cannot be identified separately from the unobserved MSA-level heterogeneity that
is absorbed by MSA × year effects. In this case, only the interaction terms with
expected horizon (Pr(stay)) can be identified, since they vary by MSA × household.
Despite the difference in the source of variation, the estimated coefficients on the
interaction terms are very close to those in columns 1 and 2.
The last two columns of Table 2 provide the average effect of the expected covariance on home owning, across households of all expected durations, by leaving
out the interaction term Pr(stay) × E( cov(PA , PB ))1/2. These estimates are identified
solely from the within-MSA variation (by occupation or industry) and are not dependent on the Pr(stay) imputation. Because E( cov(PA, PB ))1/2in this specification is
not interacted with Pr(stay), the estimated elasticity corresponds to the household
with the average expected length of stay in the sample, which is about five years
(Pr(stay) = 0.80). The estimated coefficient in the top row of column 4 is 0.367
(0.99), which suggests that if the expected covariance were to rise by one standard
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deviation, the probability of home owning would go up by 0.367 × 0.015, or almost
0.6 percentage points. Similar results are found using industry groups in column 5.
V. Robustness

One potential complication for our analysis is that if households need the wealth
from selling their prior house to afford their next house, they might be constrained
to move between markets that have correlated house price changes. If this effect
happens to vary with the MSA-level homeownership rate, it could spuriously

link the probability of owning with the expected covariance since our measure of
expected covariance is constructed using actual moves. However, we control for the
expected covariance in house prices at the MSA level. Any moving based on liquidity constraints should affect all homeowners in a MSA, since they face the same
house prices, and should therefore be absorbed by the MSA-level control. There
is little reason to think that this constraint would bind differentially within MSAs
for the various industries or occupations and be correlated with differences in their
homeownership rates, and so it should not affect our analysis.14
Nonetheless, to confirm that our results are robust to this potential complication,
we instrument for expected covariance with a covariance constructed using mobility weights that proxy for where a household would like to move if it were unconstrained. Our instrument assumes that, conditional on moving, households’ choices
of MSA are influenced by where other households in their current occupation or
industry are located. In particular, our instrument assigns household i’s (currently
living in MSA k) probability of moving to MSA l to be the share of household i’s
occupation (or industry) in MSA l relative to all other MSAs excluding k. This set
of probabilities differs by occupation (industry) within an MSA, but most of the
variation in this instrument is across occupations (industries), not across MSAs.
However, when those moving probabilities are used to weight the MSA covariance vectors, which differ across MSAs, the resulting expected covariance varies
both within and across MSAs. To instrument for Pr(stay) × E( cov(PA , PB ))1/2, we
interact Pr(stay) with the expected covariance instrument. Since Pr(stay) is imputed
using exogenous household demographics, we do not need an instrument for it. (The
first stages of the IV regressions are reported in Appendix Table A3.)
The results of this IV strategy are reported in Table 3. In column 1, the IV-estimated
coefficients for E( cov(PA, PB ))1/2and its interaction with Pr(stay) nearly double
relative to the OLS estimates in the first column of Table 2, to 4.209 (1.271) for
the expected covariance and −3.813 (0.387) for the interaction term. Despite the
larger standard errors, the IV coefficients remain statistically significant. Since the
estimates continue to be close in magnitude with opposite signs, at every expected
length of stay the estimated effect of higher expected covariance on the probability
of homeownership is about twice what was found in Table 2. As expected, those
14

The theoretical argument of this paper does not require that a household’s moving between markets be unconstrained. If a household knows in advance that, when it moves, it would need to move to a housing market where
house prices had covaried positively, it should take that into account when making its initial house purchase decision. This is why we address just the empirical implications of this potential mechanism.
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Table 3—The Relationship between Expected House Price Covariance
and the Probability of Owning (IV)
E[cov(PA , PB )] 
1/2

P(stay)i× E[cov(PA , PB )]1/2
 
P(stay)i× sr
P(stay)i
Probability weights for E[cov(PA, PB )]:
MSA × year dummies?
Instrument?

Adjusted R2
Clustering of standard errors

(1)

(2)

4.209
(1.276)
−3.813
(0.387)
2.911
(0.155)
0.930
(0.021)

3.757
(0.743)
−3.741
(0.377)
2.946
(0.171)
0.912
(0.021)

MSA ×
occupation
Yes

MSA ×
industry
Yes

MSA ×
occupation
instrument
0.2965

MSA × year ×
occupation

MSA ×
industry
instrument
0.2993

MSA × year ×
industry

(3)
−3.718
(0.162)
2.908
(0.083)
0.927
(0.010)
MSA
Yes

MSA ×
occupation
instrument
0.2964
None

Notes: N = 3,326,113. Sample period covers the 1980, 1990, and 2000 censuses. The dependent
variable is an indicator variable that takes the value of one if the respondent owns its home and
zero if the respondent rents. The probability of staying, Pr(stay), is imputed using occupation
× marital status × age category cells. The square root of the expected covariance of house
prices, E[cov(PA, PB )]1/2
 , is a moving-probability weighted average of the covariances between
the MSA of residence and possible future MSAs. The standard deviation of detrended log
rent, s r, is a MSA (k) characteristic and is subsumed by the MSA × year dummies. The standard deviations and covariances are not time-varying. The instrument replaces the actual moving rates between MSAs with each destination MSA’s share of the occupation (industry). All
regressions include as covariates: MSA × year dummies, age dummies, occupation dummies,
marital status dummies, education dummies, log real family income, and the share of moving households who remain in the MSA. Column 2 adds a detailed set of industry dummies.

households who we impute would never move still have no differential response to
changes in expected covariance. For households with Pr(stay) = 0.5, a one standard deviation greater expected covariance leads to a nearly 4 percentage point
increase in the probability of home owning. At the sample average Pr(stay), 0.8,
the same increase in expected covariance would raise the probability of owning by
just under 2 percentage points. Despite the statistical significance of the individual
reported coefficients, for levels of Pr(stay) observed in the data, the combined effect
of E( cov(PA , PB ))1/2 and E( cov(PA , PB ))1/2  × Pr(stay) becomes statistically indistinguishable from zero when instrumenting.
Column 2 of Table 3 uses industry groups rather than occupation to construct
the instrument. The estimated coefficients on E( cov(PA , PB ))1/2 and E( cov(PA , PB ))1/2
× Pr(stay) are slightly smaller in absolute value than in column 1, yet still statistically significant. Their combined effects are also statistically different from zero
as long as Pr(stay) is lower than 0.65. At Pr(stay) = 0.5, a one standard deviation
greater expected covariance leads to a 3 percentage point increase in the probability
of owning.
Column 3 uses just the MSA-level variation to construct the expected covariance,
and for the instrument uses the occupation distribution of the MSA to construct
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Table 4—Additional Specifications for the Relationship between
Expected House Price Covariance and the Probability of Owning
Include
within-MSA
moves in
E[cov]
E[cov(PA, PB )] 
1/2

P(stay)i× E[cov(PA , PB )]1/2
P(stay)i× sr
P(stay)i
1
_
   

E[var(PB)] 2 
Probability weights for E[cov(PA, PB )]:
Adjusted R2
Clustering of standard errors

(1)

Control for
E[var(PB)]1/2
 
(2)

Fully interact
covariates
with p(stay)
(3)

1.534
(0.411)
−2.121
(0.285)
2.648
(0.152)
0.910
(0.021)

2.107
(0.256)
−2.046
(0.283)
2.431
(0.141)
0.887
(0.019)
−0.570
(0.618)

1.823
(0.242)
−1.782
(0.274)
2.504
(0.126)

MSA × occupation
0.2966

MSA × occupation
0.2966

MSA × occupation
0.2980

MSA × year
× occupation

MSA × year
× occupation

MSA × year
× occupation

Notes: N = 3,326,113. Sample period covers the 1980, 1990, and 2000 censuses. The dependent variable is an indicator variable that takes the value of one if the respondent owns its home and zero if the respondent rents. The probability of staying (not moving), Pr(stay), is imputed using occupation × marital status × age category cells. The
square root of the expected covariance of house prices, E[cov(PA, PB )]1/2
 , is a moving-probability weighted average
of the covariances between the MSA of residence and possible future MSAs. The standard deviation of detrended
log rent, s r, is a MSA (k) characteristic and is subsumed by the MSA × year dummies. The standard deviations
and covariances are not time-varying. All regressions include as covariates: MSA × year dummies, age dummies,
occupation dummies, marital status dummies, education dummies, log real family income, and the share of moving
households who remain in the MSA.

where the MSA residents on average would move to. As in Table 1, the level
effect of expected covariance cannot be identified in this particular specification.
However, the interaction term has the same estimated magnitude as in columns 1
and 2, with about a 50 percent smaller standard error. In sum, the interaction term
β4remains consistently significantly and economically negative, even across all the
IV specifications. Thus we can reject the null hypothesis of no attenuation (with
expected horizon) of the effect of the moving hedge on the probability of owning on
average over the sample.
Our baseline empirical specification estimated in Table 2 was selected, in part,
for its parsimony. In Table 4, we show that our results are robust to the key choices
we made. In all cases, we show just the specification corresponding to column 1 of
Table 2, which uses MSA × occupation variation to compute the expected covariance. However, the conclusions are the same no matter which specification from
Table 2 we replicate.
The first robustness check is to use within-MSA moves for empirical identification. In the specification in equation (7), the expected covariance variable is
constructed over the set of possible out-of-MSA moves. We controlled for the possibility that owning a house could hedge against house price changes within the same
MSA by including separately an estimate of the household’s probability of moving
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within the same MSA. Alternatively, we could have included the within-MSA moving probability as another element in the weighting vector for expected covariance.
That approach would require restricting the effect of within-MSA covariance on
housing demand to be the same as across-MSA covariance. It would also require
an assumption about the expected covariance of house prices within the MSA since
we do not observe within-MSA house prices. We prefer our less restrictive identification strategy that uses just the variation in expected covariance conditional on
moving. Nonetheless, treating within-MSA covariance the same as out of MSA
covariance yields estimates that are quite similar to our baseline estimates. In the
first column of Table 4, we assume that the covariance for within-MSA moves is
equal to the MSA’s variance—i.e., the house price correlation is equal to one for
within-MSA moves—and weight within-MSA moves in the expected covariance
variable by the probability of moving within the MSA. The estimated coefficient
on the expected covariance term declines from 2.04 in the first column of Table 2
to 1.53. However, the standard error increases enough (to 0.41) that these estimated
coefficients are statistically indistinguishable. All the other coefficients of interest
are basically unchanged.15
Another covariate that has little or no effect on the estimates is a control for the
expected variance in the destination housing market. To control for housing market
 , which is our proxy for s B ,
volatility in the destination, we simply add E[var(PB )]1/2
as a covariate in our baseline specification. The expected variance is the weighted
average variance in house prices across the possible destination MSAs, conditional
on moving out of the MSA. The results are reported in column 2 of Table 4. The
estimated coefficient on E[var(PB)]1/2is negative and not statistically significant.
Including it also has virtually no effect on the other estimated coefficients. These
results are consistent with the theoretical framework in Section 2, where the effect
of the variance in house prices in the destination cities on housing demand in the
origin is ambiguous, due to the offsetting influences of rent risk and house price risk,
and attenuated, due to the discounting of future uncertainty.
The third column of Table 4 makes sure that the estimated coefficient on the interaction of Pr(stay)i× E[cov(PA , PB )]1/2is not due to a spurious correlation between
household characteristics, the expected length of stay, and the expected covariance,
by interacting all Xi covariates with Pr(stay). The estimates on the coefficients of
interest are virtually unchanged—they decline by about 10 percent but are statistically indistinguishable from the baseline estimates—when we saturate the regression with Pr(stay) interactions.
One final potential complication concerns house price formation. The model in
Section II assumes that common housing demand shocks across MSAs induce house
price covariance. However, it is possible that a housing demand shock in one MSA
could propagate to other MSAs when households move and spend their housing
capital gains, inducing a correlation between household mobility and house price

15

We also have tried testing whether the estimated coefficient on within-MSA covariance is equal to that on the
across-MSA covariance. They are not. However, the within-MSA expected covariance—which is just the MSA’s
price variance times the probability of moving within the MSA conditional on moving at all—is difficult to identify
separately from the effect of the MSA’s rent variance alone.
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covariance. If this process of price formation occurred at the MSA × occupation
× household mobility level, it would raise the issue of reverse causality contaminating our estimates of β4and β5. However, this possibility is not supported by the
data. First, even at the MSA × occupation (or MSA × industry) level, the number
of households moving from any given MSA × occupation cell to another MSA is
small and thus unlikely to influence the house price index at the destination. The
median share of the inflow of households into one MSA in a given year that comes
from a single MSA × occupation group is less than three-hundredths of one percent.
The ninety-fifth percentile is still less than three-tenths of a percent. Even if an entire
origin MSA were populated by homeowners who moved to just one destination—
which in any case would be subsumed by our MSA fixed effects—the median origin
MSA’s share of in-migrants to a particular destination would be just 1.5 percent. In
addition, including a control for the weighted average share of movers to the destination accounted for by households in each MSA × occupation group has no effect
on the parameter estimates in our baseline regression.
Second, if households moved when they had housing capital gains, and those gains
contributed to housing market covariance, then the mobility-weighted covariance
should be higher in housing booms. However, Table 1 shows that is not the case.
Lastly, in order for there to be reverse causality at the full MSA × occupation
× household mobility level that we use to identify our estimate of β5, migrants
with relatively high predicted mobility would have to move between relatively
high-covariance MSA pairs (as compared to households in the same occupation
× origin MSA cell with relatively lower predicted mobility). We tested this implication in the IPUMS by regressing the covariance of the MSA pairs a household
moved between (the ex post cov(Pk, Pl)) on its predicted mobility (Pr(stay)). We
found that households with a higher predicted mobility moved between slightly less
covarying MSA pairs, rejecting concerns of reverse causality.16
VI. Conclusion

This paper established two novel results. First, because households tend to
move among correlated housing markets, the effective covariance of house prices
across housing markets is much higher than analysts have previously assumed. We
find that half of households’ moves in the United States, excluding within-MSA
moving, are between MSAs with correlations in annual real house price growth
rates of 0.60 or greater, and 25 percent are between MSAs with more than a 0.89
correlation. When five-year house price growth rates are used, the median correlation rises to 0.74.
Second, households’ tenure decisions appear to be sensitive to the moving-hedge
benefit of home owning. Households with higher expected covariances between
house prices in their current market and their possible future markets are more

16

The estimated coefficient was statistically significant, but economically tiny. A household with a one standard
deviation lower probability of staying (so, more mobile) would have moved between an MSA pair with between a
0.03 and 0.07 standard deviation lower covariance. This result is robust to the inclusion of all the covariates we use
in Table 2, as well as complete origin and destination MSA × year fixed effects.
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likely to own. This effect attenuates with a household’s expected length of stay
in the house: less mobile households place less weight on future housing markets than do more mobile households. For a household who is likely to move in
the next two years, having a one standard deviation higher expected covariance
leads to a 2 to 4 percentage point higher homeownership rate. That relationship
diminishes with the expected length of stay in the house and is indistinguishable
from zero for households who appear unlikely to move. The results are robust to
instrumenting for the expected covariances by assuming households move proportionally to their industry shares.
The analysis in this paper suggests that the natural hedge provided by owning
a house may be quite valuable, and for many households home owning (absent
leverage) may actually reduce the risk of the total lifetime cost of obtaining housing services. As noted in Sinai and Souleles (2005), homeowners who expect
never to move are in effect hedged against housing cost risk, since they locked
in their housing costs with their initial house purchase. In this paper, we find that
even homeowners who expect to sell their house and move to another market may
be partially hedged, because the volatility in their current house price often undoes
the volatility in the price of their next house, reducing their lifetime risk on net.
By contrast, renters are exposed to volatility in housing costs in both their current
market and any future markets they might move to.
The argument that households should manage the uncertainty of their total
lifetime housing costs, not the volatility of their current house price, has important implications for evaluating the efficacy of various methods of controlling
households’ housing risk, including house price derivatives. For most households,
the positive expected covariance between house prices in their current city and
prices in possible future cities provides at least a partial hedge against house price
risk when they move. Because of that, households who use housing derivatives to
lock in the sale price of their current house may actually unhedge themselves by
reducing the covariance to zero.
This analysis may help explain why the house price derivatives market has failed
to take off, (Shiller 2008). It may simply be less expensive, easier, and nearly as
effective to hedge by owning a home. While the natural hedge provided by owning
a house is, in most cases, a partial one, providing a supplemental financial hedge
against total housing risk might be complex. Households would need to obtain a
complicated portfolio of derivatives that would hedge their total housing costs,
including their future housing costs in different markets. This important distinction is neglected in analyses that implicitly assume that the covariances between
the current and potential future housing markets are low (e.g., Case, Shiller, and
Weiss 1993; Geltner, Miller, and Snavely 1995; Voicu 2007; and Shiller 2008).17
17
de Jong, Driessen, and Van Hemert (2007) point out another reason that housing derivatives might provide a
poor hedge is that MSA-level house price indices do not explain much of the variation in individual house prices.
This point applies to within-MSA moves as well. Even Hizmo (2010), who finds that in some cities stocks of local
companies track local house prices, concludes that the correlation is not enough to significantly reduce house price
volatility. Even if one could assemble a portfolio of local stocks to short to hedge the sale price of the current home,
this paper shows that a household would also need to acquire an offsetting long portfolio of stocks local to other
cities it might move to.
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This analysis may also help explain why there are so few long-term leases in
the United States, (Genesove 1999). A long-term lease avoids rent risk and leaves
the sale price risk with the landlord. But for many mobile households there is
a potential benefit of retaining exposure to the sale price as a hedge against the
uncertainty of the cost of future housing services.
In addition, the results in this paper suggest that, for many households, the
marginal propensity to consume out of changes in house prices could be small.
To illustrate, if an increase in house prices reflects the fact that a household’s
implicit short position in future housing costs has become commensurately more
expensive, then the household’s real wealth is effectively unchanged by the housing capital gains. Unless the capital gains alleviate liquidity/collateral constraints,
the consumption response should accordingly be small. Prior research emphasized
this argument for homeowners with long expected stays in their current housing
markets, (Sinai and Souleles 2005, and Campbell and Cocco 2007). In this paper,
the high expected house price covariances that we find imply that even homeowners with short expected stays in their current housing markets can face similarly
small real wealth effects as homeowners with long horizons. That is, the high
covariances lengthen the effective horizon of households that are likely movers,
and so the wealth effect from a change in house prices will often be largely offset
by changes in housing costs in both current and expected future housing markets.18
These results can help explain the small marginal propensities to consume out of
housing wealth estimated by Attanasio et al. (2009) and Calomiris, Longhofer,
and Miles (2009), among others. Instead, our results suggest that the main channels for housing wealth effects on nonhousing consumption would be collateral
or liquidity constraints, (Ortalo-Magné and Rady 2002, Hurst and Stafford 2004,
Lustig and Van Nieuweburgh 2005).

18
This is especially true for households who expect to change location but consume similar amounts of housing
service flow. In contrast, households that are net long housing, such as seniors who expect to trade down to smaller
houses and who have a discounted bequest motive, will still have a marginal propensity to consume out of housing
capital gains, but it will be more attenuated for a household who faces high covariances. Conversely, households
that are short housing, such as young households who would like to purchase more housing, could demonstrate a
negative marginal propensity to consume out of housing capital gains because, with high covariances, increases in
future housing costs could exceed the increase in wealth from a higher home sale price. This is a potential explanation for the differences by age in the marginal propensity to consume out of housing wealth found in Campbell and
Cocco (2007) and Calomiris, Longhofer, and Miles (2011).
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Appendix
Table A1—IPUMS Data Construction
Observations
deleted
Starting observations
Exclude age < 25
Keep only heads of household
Keep only single-family households
Drop if were military households five years prior
Drop if were in college five years prior

14,159,970
10,670,270
877,100
61,092
192,144

Observations
left
37,925,632
23,765,662
13,095,392
12,218,292
12,157,200
11,965,056

Migration sample
Starting observations
Not asked about prior residence in 1980 census

1,626,943

11,965,056
10,338,113

6,765,722
41,261
64,204
494
764,579
22,830
32,019

11,965,056
5,199,334
5,158,073
5,093,869
5,093,375
4,328,796
4,281,924
4,249,905

21,292

4,228,613

Regression sample
Starting observations
Cannot match MSA to REIS or HPI data1
Exclude MSAs with incomplete HPI data2
Missing log(family income)
Unable to impute Pr(stay)
Missing sd(rent)
Cannot impute out-of-town moves
Cannot impute expected moves based on
   occupation or industry shares
Drop if Pr(stay) < = 0.5
Final sample
Sample with age < = 65

4,228,613
3,326,113

1
Reasons for a lack of a match are either that the household did not live in an MSA that
was identified in the IPUMS data or the identified MSA could not be matched to the MSAs
contained both in the REIS and HPI data.
2
MSAs with incomplete HPI data are Greenville, SC and New Haven, CT.

Table A2—Summary Statistics
Variable
Own
Probability of staying
SD(real rent growth)
SQRT(IPUMS MSA × industry-weighted
average price covariance)—actual
SQRT(IPUMS MSA × industry-weighted
average price covariance)—imputed
Average annual rent ($2,000)
Average house price ($2,000)
Rent growth rate (real)
Price growth rate (real)
Age
Family income ($2,000)
Fraction married
Fraction widowed
Fraction divorced
Fraction with less than high school ed.
Fraction with high school diploma
Fraction who attended some college
Fraction with college diploma
Share of moves that are within-MSA

Mean
0.654
0.810
0.068
0.041

Standard
deviation
0.476
0.113
0.028
0.015

0.038

0.011

10,290
170,235
0.011
0.017
44.0
64,534
0.64
0.05
0.19
0.16
0.28
0.26
0.30
0.75

3,738
87,066
0.008
0.013
11.1
58,857
0.48
0.21
0.39
0.37
0.45
0.44
0.46
0.04
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Table A3—First Stages of the IV Regressions
(1)

Column of Table 3

(2)

P(stay)i
P(stay)i
E[cov(PA, PB)]1/2
 
E[cov(PA, PB)]1/2
 
× E[cov(PA, PB)]1/2
× E[cov(PA, PB)]1 /2
Constructed
0.324
0.393
−0.681
−0.614
(0.002)
(0.002)
(0.001)
(0.002)
E[cov(PA, PB)]1/2
1.217
0.067
1.166
0.027
P(stay)i
(0.001)
(0.002)
(0.001)
(0.001)
× constructed
1/2
E[cov(PA, PB)] 

Original covariate

Adjusted R2

Probability weights
for E[cov(PA, PB)]:

Instrument?

Clustering of
standard errors

0.9558

0.9520

0.9651

0.9628

(3)

Pr(stay)i  
× E[cov(PA, PB)]1/2
−0.950
(0.0003)
1.173
(0.0002)
0.9984

MSA × occupation

MSA × industry

MSA × occupation

MSA × occupation

MSA × industry

MSA × occupation

MSA × year
× occupation

MSA × year
× industry

none

Notes: N = 3,326,113. Sample period covers the 1980, 1990, and 2000 censuses. The covariance of house prices is a probabilityweighted average of the covariances between the MSA of residence and possible future MSAs. The dependent variable is the expected
covariance weighted by the actual probability of staying (not moving). The instrument replaces the actual moving rates with each
destination MSA’s share of the industry or occupation group. The probability of staying is imputed using occupation × marital status × age category cells. The standard deviations and covariance are not time-varying. All regressions include MSA × year dummies,
Pr(stay), the standard deviation of real rents, age dummies, occupation dummies, marital status dummies, education dummies, log
real family income, the share of moving households who remain in the MSA, and a detailed set of industry dummies.
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